A Précis of Hilary Putnam's Model Theoretic Argument for Internal Realism

Metaphysical Realism (MR) is not one claim but, Putnam argues, a package of interrelated claims about the mind-world relationship. The key components of MR are 1) the independence thesis; 2) the correspondence thesis; 3) the uniqueness thesis. The independence thesis states that there is a fixed totality of mind independent objects (the world). The correspondence thesis […]

Nature Unbound: Brassier on Churchland’s Realism

A number of writers in the Speculative Realist blogosphere have cited Ray Brassier’s discussion of Paul Churchland’s attempt to reconcile scientific realism and a Prototype Vector Activation (PVA) theory of content in Chapter 1 of Nihil Unbound (Brassier 2007). Though I am reasonably familiar with the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland, I recall finding […]

Transforming the Human, Dublin City University 21-23 Oct

  Just had time to peruse the programme for the Transforming The Human Conference, Dublin City University Oct 21-3. It has less mainstream analytic bioethics than I expected and more stuff on the ‘metaphysics’ of transhumanism and posthumanism. I think this emphasis is correct. We can’t take folk notions of personhood, embodiment or mind for […]

Harman on Patterns and Harms

Quentin Meillassoux’s  coinage ‘correlationism’ refers to any position which holds that thought can only think the relation between thought and its object; never the object as an absolute without relation to cognition. Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology are correlationisms. They conceive objectivity as an invariant structure of possible experience. Husserl conceives physical objectivity in terms of […]

Why OOO is reductionist or eliminativist

Well, to be fair, it probably isn’t, but, on the strength of this post over at Larval Subjects, Bryant might just believe that it is. The idea seems to be that representation depends on dynamic and fluid interactions between objects, thus either representation is not what we thought it was (reductionism) or there ain’t such […]